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BOOK REVIEWS
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICAL ADMINISTRATION. Edited by Arthur T.
Vanderbilt. Published by The Law Center of New York University
for The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949. Pp. xxxii,
752. $7.50.
This interesting book presents a new and refreshing approach to a field
of law which for too many generations has been bogged down with technical
anachronisms and purely local perspective. The function and scope of the
book is aptly indicated by the following statement taken from its Introduc-
tion:
"Aside from inertia the greatest obstacle to the modernization of judicial administra-
tion has been the lack of complete detailed knowledge of what should be done in each
state to give it a reasonably effective procedural system. Such knowledge the present
volume supplies." (P. xxvii).
The volume consists principally of 494 pages containing an easy-to-read
factual survey showing whether or not-or in what degree-each state is
complying with those minimum practical standards of court organization and
procedure approved unanimously by the American Bar Association at its
1938 annual meeting at Cleveland, Ohio. There are nine chapters dealing
with court organization and procedure; and one chapter on "State Ad-
ministrative Agencies and Tribunals" which compares present state systems
of administrative agency organization and procedure with the Federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act.
The chapters on court organization and procedure consider such subjects
as: Judicial Selection, Conduct and Tenure; Managing The Business of the
Courts; Rule-Making-The Judicial Regulation of Procedure; Pretrial
Conferences; Trial Practice; The Law of Evidence; and Appellate Practice.
Each chapter begins with a headnote containing the recommendations adopted
by the American Bar Association relevant to the subject matter. In large
type the main text then provides a discussion of the background and purpose
of the recommended standards, a classification of the states into various groups,
and a report showing the existing situation with respect to the subject
standard in each state. The results are conveniently illustrated by 62 maps
of the United States graphically portraying in colors of deep black, speckled
and pure white the standing of each state with respect to the recommended
standard; and a "Conclusion" at the end of each chapter briefly discusses the
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current trend with respect to the subject standard in the states generally.
Pages 495-691 consist of appendices setting forth the 1938 reports of the
committees of the Section on Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association in which the recommended standards were formulated. The
remainder of the book consists of sixty pages of index.
Lawyers make a living working for clients, and problems of clients are
usually problems in substantive law. Thus it is that "lawyers are so pre-
occupied with the substantive problems of their clients that they have little
time to devote to the great problem of ways and means in the law that we
call judicial administration and procedural law." (P. xvii). Yet the law of
procedure is the law which determines the lawyer's costs of production-i.e.,
the number of trips he must make to the courthouse, the time he must spend
there waiting to present a motion or take some other intermediate step, as
well as the hours and days spent in investigating facts and waiting for the
opponent to take the next step. After a lawyer has been in the general prac-
tice for a number of years he tends to acquire a substantial quantity of in-
formation concerning existing procedural law. But, unfortunately, this
acquired information is almost wholly derived from a local perspective.
"Every state borrows freely from other states in each branch of the substan-
tive law, but in the sphere of procedure they have been, for the most part,
peculiarly provincial." (P. xxi). Since the promulgation in 1938 of the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there has been a renewed interest in
court organization and procedure. It is to be hoped that there will develop
from it an inquiry concerning a proper perspective to the law of procedure;
what community values and objectives are involved; what purely professional
values and objectives are involved; and what alternatives there are for ac-
complishing the desirable objectives.
For those who would seek to formulate a proper perspective on the
subject matter presented in this book, the reports in the appendices provide
a wealth of interesting research and study. The summary of the different rules
applied in each state compared with the recommended standard discussed in
the main text, provide the alternatives for evaluation. The result to the reader
is a rich experience in attaining a broad perspective with respect to procedure
generally and an excellent basis for evaluating legal procedure in his own state.
The style of the book is simple and nontechnical and the subject matter
is easily comprehended. It is the expressed hope of the Editor that the book
will be read by laymen as much as by lawyers. Intelligent laymen, who in
recent years have been adjusting their legal problems through arbitrators, trade
associations and administrative agencies, may well provide the needed
stimulus for a wholesome consideration of the existing system of judicial
administration with a view toward attaining a more economic, time saving
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and efficient court organization and procedure.' Even the layman reader can
easily see how his own state stands with respect to each recommended standard,
and how it compares with neighboring and other states.2
The preparation of the main text of the book was unique. The objective
was to present a "factual survey" of the existing organizations and procedures
in each state and compare each to the recommended standards. Questionnaires
pertaining to each recommended standard were sent to "reporters" in each
state, usually members of the Junior Bar Conference. "The war retarded
some of the answers to the questionnaires . . .but much more time was lost
through the obvious failure of some of the state reporters to comprehend some
of the questions submitted to them. Our ineptitude for dealing with problems
of procedure was demonstrated even among those who obviously desired
to be useful, and the consequent necessity of seeking substitutes caused
further delay. Another great difficulty arose from the fact that seemingly
simple legal terms used in the questionnaires often turned out to mean one
thing in one state and something quite different in another." (P. xxvii). The
state returns were then checked by at least two persons from each state,
usually a judge or a practitioner and a law school professor.
It would be surprising if a book containing so much local material from
the various states did not have some errors. This one may have, but at best
they are trivia and do not at all detract from the principal purpose and
function of the book in providing an enlightened perspective on values and
objectives in court organization, administration, and procedure and the exist-
ing alternatives for attaining such objectives.
To Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the editor who prepared the main text; to
Judge John J. Parker, to whom it is dedicated and who has worked so enthu-
siastically for improvement; to the great leaders of the American legal pro-
fession-judges, lawyers, and law professors-who prepared the committee
reports in the appendices; and to the countless others in each state who had
the interest and the initiative to prepare and check the state returns a sincere
expression of genuine appreciation is due. The work is truly representative of
the best thinking in the American legal profession.
1. Such a consideration might well begin with a study of the entirely independent trial
courts in a single county with nevertheless overlapping jurisdiction. The dockets of some
of these courts tend to become overcrowded with resultant delay and expense while other
courts having fewer cases move along with leisure. In most states there is no effective
means for assigning judges to judicial service so as to relieve conjestion of dockets and
utilize the available judges to the best advantage. What is needed is an integrated
system of trial courts operating under the management of the state supreme court.
Chapter 2 of the book discusses the system now existing in the federal courts, together
with the functions of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
2. See Porter, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration: The Extent of Their
Acceptance, 36 A.B.A.J. 614-18 (1950), containing two interesting tables showing the
degree of acceptance by each state of all the minimum standards recommended by the
American Bar Association. A treatment of Tennessee law is found in Fort, Tennessee in
Relation to Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, 21 TENx. L. Rxv. 506 (1950).
1951 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of Hewlett v. George6 in 1891. Recovery was denied on grounds of public
policy, the court stating, "The peace of society,... and a sound public policy,
... forbid to the minor child a right ... [to assert] a claim to civil redress
for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent."'7 This doctrine of
domestic tranquillity was carried to the extreme in Roller v. Roller,8 which
denied relief to a daughter who had been raped by her father. This rule of
nonliability has become generally recognized, and a great body of authority
supporting it has been built up in this country.9
However, there is a trend in modern decisions to depart from the rule
by way of restriction, exception and modification. The rule of parental
immunity is applicable only to suits brought by unemancipated children;
where the child has been emancipated, the action may be maintained. 10 The
courts are in conflict on extending immunity to a person who is not the
natural parent but stands in loco parentis.11 Where the ultimate liability rests
on an insurer, several courts have held the nonliability rule inapplicable." -'
6. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L.R.A. 682 (1891). Here a minor daughter, married
but separated from her husband, brought an action for false imprisonment against her
mother. Whether she had resumed her former place in her mother's home, and the relation-
ship of a minor child to her parent, did not sufficiently appear. The court denied recovery
without citing any precedent or making any examination of the early authorities.
7. 9 So. at 887.
8. The court stated that "... if it be once established that a child has a right to sue
a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarkation which can be drawn, for the
same principle which would allow the action in the case of a heinous crime, like the one
involved in this case, would allow an action to be brought for any other tort." Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788, 789, 68 L.R.A. 893, 894 (1905).
9. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929) ; Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.
App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924), 9
MINN. L. REv. 76; Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Goldstein v.
Goldstein, 4 N.J. Misc. 711, 134 Atl. 184 (1926) ; Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y.
626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928) ; Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12, 31 A.L.R. 1135
(1923), 33 YALE L.J. 315 (1924) ; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atd. 198 (1925)
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903), 17 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1904);
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), 53 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 387; Zuter V.
O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930).
10. See Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763, 764 (1908) ("The gen-
eral rule is that a minor cannot sue his parent for a tort; but, if he has been emancipated,
he can") ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 913, 71 A.L.R. 1055, 1068 (1930)
("When the right of discipline and family association have been surrendered, a rule in-
tended to preserve their integrity is not applicable").
11. Immunity extended: Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924), 9
MINN. L. REy. 76 (husband and wife paid by county to care for illegitimate child);
Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1907) (person who was to "support,
educate, care for and treat as his own child") ; Richardson v. State Board, 98 NJ.L. 690,
121 At. 457 (1923), aff'd, 99 N.J.L. 516, 123 Atl. 720 (1924) (member of Board of
Trustees of day nursery) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903)
(father and stepmother). Immunity not extended: Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129
S.W.2d 245 (1939) (adoptive father) ; Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61
N.E. 961 (1901) (stepmother) ; Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913)
(maternal grandparents) ; Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 273, 95 N.W. 640, 5 ANN. CAS. 112
(1903) (maternal aunt) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) (schoolmaster) ; Steler v.
Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173, 43 A.L.R. 501 (1925) (officer of juvenile court).
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 71 A.L.R. 1055 (1930) (fact that the
father has provided for satisfying the judgment by liability insurance removes the suit
from the class promotive of family discord) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E, 538
(1932) (court should not grant immunity as a mere gratuity).
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able income. Tax problems are involved in every matter on which the general
practitioner is consulted.
This book is especially valuable to the lawyer who shies away from tax
matters. It contains a wealth of practical information of the kind that is not
generally acquired except through actual experience. The author has had a
long and successful career in the tax field, both within the Bureau and on the
side of the taxpayer. He leads the reader through every step of tax practice
from the problems of the simple return, the informal conferences with Bureau
agents, the more legalistic meetings with the Technical Staff, to the formal
litigation before the courts. The practical problems encountered at each stage
what data to disclose, what arguments to use, what compromise possibilities
exist, are discussed in detail with many helpful suggestions. Within the pages
of this book will be found something that comes pretty close to equipping the
general practitioner with a background and confidence in the handling of tax
cases that is normally acquired only through painful experience.
In the chapter entitled "Controlling the Tax Burden," the author develops
the advisory side of tax practice. He discusses many of the ways in which tax
burdens may be reduced by advance planning, by so shaping transactions as to
insure the minimum tax. This chapter itself is worth the price of the book.
However, to me, the most profitable chapters are those dealing with the
problem of valuation. Dean Griswold has said: "There are few problems in
law or economics where the criteria are more uncertain than in questions of
value."5 The author's approach to this perplexing riddle, present in so many
tax cases, is as good as any I have seen. It warrants careful study. The time so
spent will pay ample dividends for in this field there is a real opportunity for
the lawyer to use all the skills of advocacy. They are as essential here as
in the typical negligence case. The outcome of any valuation dispute depends
on the thoroughness of investigation, the marshaling* of relevant facts,
the persuasiveness of presentation. Whether an asset with no market value
will be found to be worth $20,000, $30,000 or $40,000 will in large
measure depend upon the advocacy of the taxpayer's lawyer just as
surely as it does in determining the amount of a wrongful death award. This
book is recommended to every practicing lawyer. The style makes for easy,
interesting reading. There are few citations and none of the technical jargon
that discourages the beginner. Yet it contains a tremendous fund of practical
suggestions that the reader will find invaluable in his practice.
WILLIAM J. Bowa'*
5. GRIswoLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 656 (3d ed. 1950).
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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AVAILABILITY FOR WORK. By Ralph Altman.1 Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1950. Pp. 350. $4.50.
Ralph Altman has made a valuable contribution to the unemployment
insurance program in this country in this book. He points out the need for
such a work in his own preface. Fifty-one American jurisdictions (48 states,
Alaska, District of Columbia and Hawaii) have their own unemployment
compensation laws. Each of these laws stipulates that unemployed workers
may not draw benefits unless they are able to work and are available for work.
The objective of this book is to discuss the meaning of this statutory provision.
The book is intended primarily for the use of workers in the field of social
insurance; it should, however, be of considerable value to all who have prob-
lems in that field. It is unique in that it presents the first full-scale book-size
study of the subject. The author has appended a number of valuable tables
which are particularly worthwhile from a reference standpoint. One of the
tables present a comparison of the state unemployment compensation laws
through November 30, 1949. Another presents a comparison of the factors
considered in the various laws relating to suitable work as of November 30,
1949.
The book is replete with reference to source material which indicates the
vast amount of detailed study given to the subject by the author. One chapter
is devoted to a thorough discussion of the labor market and the significance
of that factor in connection with the general subject of availability. The author
reminds us of the long accepted truth that one of the outstanding character-
istics of the labor market is the relative immobility of workers. The relative
immobility of labor from an occupational as well as a geographic standpoint is
indeed a frequent question to be considered in determining the availability of
the unemployment insurance claimant. The unemployed worker who clings to
the community or occupation and who declines other work opportunity
prompts the administrator or the referee to question his continued attachment
to the labor market. Other problems in connection with the labor market are
pointed up, such as the wage treatment of negroes and women, the effect of
employer organizations and labor unions on the general wage structure, the
nonstandard characteristics of the labor transaction.
Labor force is discussed separately and the changes that have taken place
in it since 1900 are given very thorough treatment. For instance, it is pointed
out that there has been a steady increase in the 45 to 64 year old male worker
group since the beginning of the century. It is also noted that there has been
an increased number of 25 to 44 year old women workers in the labor market
and the trend seems to continue in that direction. The author takes the ap-
1. Technical Advisor, Bureau of Employment Security.
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parently sound view that there is greater mobility among young workers than
among old workers and that there is also greater mobility among unskilled
workers than among skilled workers. This factual matter dealing with the labor
market and the labor force is in a sense preparatory for the discussion of the
general principles of availability themselves which appear subsequently in the
work.
Mr. Altman has devoted two chapters to what he calls general principles.
In these chapters he emphasizes four points which appear to be the heart of
his work.
First, he seeks to explain the availability requirement by describing it
as a gross sieve requirement. By that he means the general availability require-
ment will exclude only those claimants which are patently ineligible. Those that
seem to be borderline cases will receive a determination on the basis of the
"work test," his view being, of course, that the best test of any worker's
availability is the acceptance or rejection of an offer of suitable work.
Second, the writer discusses the question of the burden of proof in con-
nection with the claimant's application for unemployment insurance benefits.
He points out that many states, including Tennessee, hold that the burden of
proof is on the claimant to establish his availability. He evidently feels that
this rule is unsound.2 He feels that a more reasonable approach would place the
burden of obtaining evidence necessary to support its decision upon the un-
employment compensation agency. It does not appear that the author has fully
sustained his position; however, it must be conceded that from a theoretical
standpoint it has considerable merit. From a practical standpoint his view
would render administration of the program more difficult.
The author thoroughly discusses the extent to which a claimant should be
available for "suitable work" in order to meet the statutory test. He points out
that a number of states hold that a claimant should be fully available for all
forms of suitable work but personally subscribes to the view that the claimant
should merely be available for a substantial amount of suitable work. He em-
phasizes the difficulties of determining the question of suitability and also points
out some of the difficulties of following the suggested rule, particularly in de-
fining "substantial amount of work."
The fourth point discussed deals with the search for work required to
demonstrate availability. Mr. Altman points out that the original acts required
that the claimant be able to work and available for work and that the early ad-
ministrative and judicial decisions show no indication of the requirement of an
independent search for work on the part of the claimant. Later, some of the
decisions indicated that more was required of the claimant than simply register-
2. "When this is the rule appeal may become a futile formality. Unemployed workers,
lacking, as is usually the case, the aid of legal counisel, may present their story but fail for
lack of proper technical guidance to make out a prima facie case... ." (p. 104).
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ing for work-that the claimant should make some effort to terminate his un-
employment. This evolved into a rule that the claimant should make reasonable
efforts to obtain work. Finally, during the period 1946-1947, some sixteen
jurisdictions sought to make the availability requirement more restrictive by
requiring that the claimant be "actively seeking work," or that he simply be
"seeking work," or that he make "reasonable efforts to obtain work." Today,
20-odd jurisdictions have amended their laws to make this requirement more
restrictive.
Mr. Altman favors a middle of the road policy. He recommends what he
calls an active but guided search for work. He points out that the Employment
Service is not the only channel for job openings, that some jobs are normally
handled through the Employment Service while others are usually handled by
private employment agencies. Still other jobs are normally filled by the em-
ployers who "hire at the gate." So long as such a condition prevails the
claimant should be given labor markets information and job counseling. Spe-
cifically, he should be helped in mapping out a definite plan for his job search.
The author seems to make out his best case on this point. This is understand-
able inasmuch as most unemployment compensation authorities agree that the
independent search for work means nothing. It neither tests the worker's
availability nor, in most instances, finds jobs. On the other hand, the require-
ment that the claimant make reasonable efforts to obtain work is indefinite. In
truth, however, his concept of an active but guided search for work could fit
into the reasonable-efforts-to-obtain-work rule. The author also presents a
great deal of material on other factors relating to availability, including ability
to work, hours and other time limitations and self-employment.
This book is primarily a reference book and is recommended for all




F6RRESTER'S EDITION OF DOBIE AND LADD'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. By Ray Forrester.' St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1950, Pp. vii, 990. $8.50.
In 1940, Messrs. Dobie and Ladd published their monumental Cases and
Materials on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure. It was a fine book with a
wealth of materials in a field already overcomplex. If any criticism at all was
*Director, Unemployment Compensation Division, Tennessee Department of Em-
ployment Security.
tAssistant Chief Counsel, Tennessee Department of Employment Security.
1. Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
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proper, it would be that the volume was too encyclopedic. True, there is much
to be said for a profusion of materials from which the instructor can make his
own selection as need appears to him to require. But also involved are *matters
of perspective and emphasis which may be thrown somewhat askew for the
student, unlike the practitioner, by an exemplification of detail. At any rate
the passage of time and the further deterioration of federal procedure under the
twin blows of legislative reform and judicial states' rightism made a new
edition imperative. That Dean Forrester has given us with fine craftsmanship
in the new volume.
What we have, therefore, is a fully revised and quite modernized book.
Dean Forrester has retained the old chapter divisions, but has combined or
omitted a considerable number of section topics. Moreover, he has apparently
revalued the teaching worth of all the cases reprinted, for he has omitted some
and re-edited others. This gain in condensation seems to me all to the good.
Thus he has been able to include a goodly number of the very important, albeit
very lengthy, new Supreme Court cases in the field and yet his edition is nearly
a hundred pages less in bulk than the old one. At the same time in revising
he has occasionally lengthened the extracts from the old landmarks and has
even added others of the ancient precedents. Of course the material is still
considerable, too much for any ordinary course, as he concedes in his preface
and in his suggestions for omissions.
Thus I think what he has done is a real gain, adding realistically to the
teaching value of this already useful collection. Such subjects as original and
diversity jurisdiction and venue have now an impact on and indeed an interest
for the student which is obtained by thorough plowing into the subject. If any-
thing, I think this editorial trend may well be carried further. Indeed, force
of circumstances may compel such a result in new editions. What the new
Judicial Code has done to problems of removal, and to venue in such matters
as transfer under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and what the courts
are now doing to the Judicial Code2 will require intensive treatment, at least.
I suggest that for pedagogical purposes, as well as for practitioners' needs,
such treatment will be more important than a complete coverage of all, even
the more esoteric, details of federal jurisdiction. Casebook editors, as well as
teachers, in my view, should resolutely steel themselves against "covering a
subject." It is not merely impossible; it is undesirable. For it turns the attention
from the battlefields to the bypaths of the law.
This brings me to a point where my views apparently diverge from not
only the editor here, but the editors of that other valuable casebook in the field,
Messrs. McCormick and Chadbourn, in the second edition just published of
2. I have mentioned just a few of these developing problems in my review of
McCoILHnCK AND CHADBOURN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1950),
36 CORN. L. Q. 181 (1950).
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their Cases and Materials on Federal Courts. Both these new editions call
special attention to the rather complete revision now made of the material on
the Federal Civil Rules and its amplification with respect to important topics
thereof, such as deposition and discovery. I can see that much time and thought
have been put upon this topic in each volume, in this one indeed comprising
more than 200 pages in addition to the 130-page reprint of the rules them-
selves. And I expect I hardly need to say that I am vastly interested in the
rules. Nevertheless I wish the editors had not done it. And it is because of my
interest that I say this. I think the pleading principles set forth in the rules
are more pervasive than merely the federal judicial establishment itself and
they should certainly be taught in, indeed be at the basis of, present law school
courses in pleading. But they cannot be taught in the interstices of a course
so full of general technicalities as the subject of federal jurisdiction. Even the
valiant attempt of this casebook gives me some distress by its sketchiness on
many vital problems. Thus I find hardly adequate the undertaking to set forth
the modern philosophy of pleading by textbook suggestions by even so good
an author as Professor Moore and by a few decisions, among which is included
one of my own now having a rather suprising posthumous fame in the case-
books ;3 in truth, it seems if too little, then too much. Moreover, the editor
has still found it necessary, as is indeed appropriate, to include portions of the
rules under other topics, as, for example, the rules of party joinder in the
section on diversity jurisdiction. Here, too, I believe rigorous self-denial
would assign to the pleading courses all material on the civil rules of equal and
general significance to the development of pleading in the states as well as
the federal system, and would retain here only those which may affect the
peculiarities of federal jurisdiction.
The reference I have made to the book of Messrs. McCormick and Chad-
bourn may suggest some obligation upon a reviewer to make a comparative
evaluation of these two new editions appearing so contemporaneously. But
just as in the past I have found points of value in the earlier editions,
4 so I
should be hard put to it to make a choice, because each book has interesting
suggestions and ideas. Thus I somewhat prefer the greater compactness of
McCormick and Chadbourn, while, on the other hand, I like individual treat-
ment of certain topics, such as venue, of Forrester. No teacher can go far amiss
with using either book. Ultimate choice must depend largely upon the impact
upon the individual teacher of particular topics and their treatment in each
volume. The difficulty now is not with the law teaching possibilities in this
field. They are attractive indeed because of the competent authorities, casebook
3. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), which still does not strike
me as so unusual as to deserve its apparent notoriety.




and textual, at hand and because of the appealing intricacies of the subject
matter. The difficulty, on the other hand, in a wider sense is with the subject
itself and with the pitfalls for the possible litigant which are developing at an
apparently accelerating rate.
I have stated elsewhere5 my pessimism as to the present and future of
this field in the law and need not repeat it here at length. In my judgment it is a
reflection upon the lawyer that operation of the dual system of courts known as
federalism is of necessity developing and even adding to friction as time goes
on. The hope of reform stimulated by the pendency of a new Judicial Code has
now been exhausted in the considerable confusion resulting from the enactment
of what boldly started as a major reform, and is still an accomplishment in
spots, though it has projected so many new problems as on the whole to in-
crease the murkiness of the federal judicial atmosphere.6 Along with this has
been the constant encroachment on federal uniform procedure of state techni-
calities through the increasing impact of the Erie-Tompkins doctrine, which
step by step, hardly perceived as each is taken, is now having the usual pro-
cedural consequence that the technical drives out the less technical procedure.7
In my review just cited of the competing volume I suggested to the editors that,
the problem being of such major importance, they consider the possibility of
stepping somewhat more than usual out of editorial calm to try to bring its
unnecessary complexities more acutely home to the students and the profession.
I am disposed to repeat that suggestion here, although I must confess that I
am not at all sure how much casebook editors can be expected to accomplish
on an issue of such social significance. Perhaps the best we can do is to await
the inevitable reaction toward a new burst of federal reform which many of
us feel is now again overdue.
CHARLES E. CLARK*
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Obviously these questions cannot reach the Supreme Court for solution with any-
thing like the rapidity of their arising. One such, the "separate cause of action" newly
imported in the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, with consequences which I think are
implied in a case such as American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 181 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.
1950), may perhaps be settled by the forthcoming Supreme Court decision therein,
although I fear that no one decision can now close the Pandora's box which the un-
fortunate phrasing has reopened.
7. As suggested in a sophisticated comment such as Note, Federal Procedure: The
"Outcome" Test Applied in Actions Based on Diversity of Citizenshlip, 35 Come. L.Q.
420 (1950). See also other citations in my review note 2 supra, at n.8; and for the impact
of a Gresham's Law of pleading, whereby the poor drives out the good, see my article,
Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 493, 498, 505 (1950).
*United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit; member and reporter, Advisory Com-
mittee of United States Supreme Court on Federal Civil Procedure.
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LIFE INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING. By William J. Bowe.'
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1950. Pp. 90. $2.10.
In this little book, beautifully printed and handsomely bound, Professor
Bowe covers all the important topics that fall under its title. Considering
the torrent of writing on these topics in insurance and tax periodicals,
looseleaf services, pamphlets and texts with hard covers, this is in itself an
achievement. For such success, good organization of material, a sure touch
in selecting the topics to be discussed and a clear style are required. All
these merits the book has.
Uses of life insurance in estate planning, good and bad, are first
discussed. Then there is an excellent exposition of the manner in which
life insurance proceeds become subject to Federal estate tax, and how they
can escape the tax by way of the marital deduction. Supplementing such
exposition, Professor Bowe includes historical notes on the estate taxation of
life insurance, with penetrating criticisms and suggestions as to what
ought to be done in this field.
Following such background, there is a discussion of practical planning
with life insurance-and what appears under that heading really is practical.
The last seventeen pages deal with the very important topic of survivor-
purchase agreements. Here, too, the author's style serves him well; and many
will do well to heed his warnings that the purchase price fixed in such
agreements may not in every case control valuation for estate tax purposes.
I would dispute, however, the suggestion (pp. 73 et seq.) that it is perhaps
more common and perhaps better, to have each stockholder purchase the
insurance on his own life payable to his own estate-instead of having each
apply for and own the insurance on the life of the other. But this is the
only item in the book as to which I would differ.
Lawyers have not begun to realize the importance of life insurance
and how to deal with it. For a lawyer who wants to make a serious study
of the uses of life insurance in estate planning, this is an ideal starter. And
those who are constantly dealing with life insurance, either as lawyers or
underwriters or accountants, will do well to have it near them.
JOSEPH TRACHMAN:'
1. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
*Member, New York Bar; Lecturer on Estate Planning, New York University,
School of Law, Graduate Division; author, ESTATE PLANNING (1949 ed.) (Monograph
in Practicing Law Institute series, Current Problems in Federal Taxation).
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